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ABSTRACT
Physical goods creation involves significant variable costs while online service provision and software
development often do not. The objective of this study is to investigate whether these cost structure
variations lead to differences in the characteristics of initial public offerings (IPOs) for traditional firms
versus online service and software firms.
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INTRODUCTION
Initial Public Offering (IPO) studies commonly group all firms together for the purpose of identifying the
factors that affect returns, risk, and likelihood of failure (see Ritter and Welch, 2002, for a synopsis of
IPO research). As the number of Information Technology (IT) related products and services has grown
considerably in the past decades, it has become apparent that the cost structures of these new ventures
differ quite dramatically when compared with more traditional physical product manufacturing,
distributing, and retailing firms. Traditional firms must manage marginal costs such as materials and labor
that are very different from online service and software (OSS) firms. But does this result in differences for
IPO firms across these product and service sectors? If there are differences, then perhaps IPO firms
should be first categorized and then separately analyzed to predict their results. Loughran and Ritter
(1997), for example, show that firms that issue seasoned securities have falling operating profit to asset
ratios following the offering and are worse for the small issues. However, nearly 15% of the firms were in
OSS industries. The cost structures of these firms and their product market may have been an important
factor in explaining the drop in operating profit.
For companies that provide online services (e.g., America Online, eBay, career services companies,
telecommunications companies, etc.), or for software development companies like Microsoft, marginal
costs are low or nearly non-existent. For example, the cost for eBay to add its millionth user is nearly
zero. This is a favorable situation for these firms as they grow, but the downside is that these same firms
typically have a large up-front fixed cost that is incurred for offering the service or software to even one
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user. Because of these differences in the relative degree of fixed versus marginal costs of doing business,
there are inherent differences in each firm’s risk in their early years (Wilbon 2002). More of a traditional
firm’s costs are incurred later as production increases while much more cost is incurred earlier by online
service and software firms. Said another way, traditional firms have a better match between revenue and
cost as their sales increases. This relative comparison is summarized in Table 1.

Traditional Firm
Online Service Firm
Software Firm

Fixed
Cost
Lower
Higher
Higher

Marginal
Cost
Higher
Lower
Lower

Relative
Risk
Lower
Higher
Higher

Table 1. Relative Cost Structures

Given the differences identified above, it would be expected that the characteristics of firms at the time of
their IPO will vary according to their relative cost structures and associated risks. In fact there is evidence
that differences in firm characteristics, and not market irrationality, were largely to blame for the socalled dot-com bubble (Ljungqvist & Wilhelm 2003). Moreover, much of the research concerning online
service and software firms treat them more as technology firms than in a more fundamental cost-structure
framework (see, for example, Schill and Zhou 2001 and Viswanathan 2005).
In this study we examine the characteristics of IPOs of OSS firms versus traditional firms as they relate to
cost structure. Specifically, we address the following questions. First, are OSS firms different from
traditional firms at the time of their IPOs? And second, are there differences between OSS firms
themselves at the time of their IPOs? The following section provides a theoretical foundation for why
there may be differences in success and failure for OSS firms versus traditional firms. Subsequent
sections present the research methodology and data collected, the tests of hypotheses, and the implications
and conclusions arising from the findings of this study.

A MODEL: OSS VERSUS TRADITIONAL FIRMS
A model developed by Ronnen (1991), where firms enter a quality-regulated market by choosing a
particular level, can be applied to our IPOs with only minor adjustments. In the Ronnen model, minimum
quality standards are imposed. Firms choose quality levels and enter the market based on their ability to
expend fixed costs. If the standards are too high, such that fixed costs are beyond the means of all firms,
none enter. But as the quality standards are relaxed more firms can participate. If the quality standard is
low enough but the overall range narrow, firms tend to compete less on quality and more on price such
that consumers, overall, are better off. Because marginal costs are exogenous in Ronnen’s model it is
fixed cost that prevents some firms from raising their quality level and attempting to compete with highquality firms. Those that try to compete at a level beyond their means fail when price competition
obliterates profits.
In our adaptation of the Ronnen model, the OSS firms have a minimum quality standard set, not by
regulators, but based on the previously developed hardware that dominates the medium. As Ronnen
argues, the minimum quality also results in consumers choosing higher quality than they would without
the standard. Because marginal cost in Ronnen’s model is exogenous, it plays no role in reaching
equilibrium and consequently is consistent with our assumption of OSS firms’ cost structures.
Ronnen’s firms choose quality levels based on their ability to expend fixed costs as do our OSS firms. We
can expand upon Ronnen’s fixed cost assumption by recognizing that our OSS firms, like most firms,
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have varying abilities to pay fixed costs which may be based upon, among other things, economies of
scale, expertise, or existing resources. Hence those firms with lower fixed costs cannot compete at higher
quality levels. As Ronnen shows, for those that do, subsequent price competition eventually results in
failure.
As an alternative, firms choose a quality level consistent with their fixed cost. Consumers will gravitate
toward firms with at least some minimum quality level which becomes the industry standard. Firms with
a lower-quality product will eventually disappear. Unfortunately for these firms, exactly what that
standard is may not be known at the outset.
While non-OSS firms may also have the ability to enter markets at varying quality levels based on their
ability to cover fixed costs, there are two fundamental differences from the OSS firms. The first is that
marginal costs play a more important role in general. As a result, in the long-run, other factors influence
which firms survive and are successful. The other difference is the lack of quality standards. Hence a
broader range of firms will enter the market. Because their products are not as likely to be all or
nothing—the industry standard or shunned—in general they are less likely to be smaller start-ups at their
IPO and less likely to need capital to continue.
We can make predictions based on the model, made formal in the following hypotheses:
H1: OSS firms are younger at the IPO than traditional firms
H2: Total assets for OSS firms are lower at the IPO than traditional firms
H3: Revenues for OSS firms are lower at the IPO than traditional firms
H4: Net income for OSS firms is lower than traditional firms
H5: Return on assets for OSS firms are lower than traditional firms
H6: OSS firms are riskier than traditional firms

METHODOLOGY AND DATA
The sample for the study consists of IPOs with offer dates from 1998 through 2002. IPOs issued during
these years were identified from the Thomson Financial SDC database which includes all U.S. domestic
IPOs. We removed unit offerings, financial institutions, closed-end funds, REITS, limited partnerships,
and stocks with offering prices of less than $2.
For each IPO we identified a set of characteristics of the offer and the firm. We focused primarily on the
firm characteristics at the time of the offer. Offering particulars such as the offer price and number of
shares offered were found in the SDC database. After-market prices and returns are from CRSP and
accounting information is from S&P Compustat. After removing firms with missing data we are left with
a total sample of 1,231 IPOs. As our study is an examination of the differences in characteristics between
two distinct types of firms, our analysis primarily employs differences in means tests. Table 2 provides an
overall summary for the sample firms for the five year period.

Characteristic
Offer
Proceeds ($million)
Offer Price ($/share)
Shares (millions)
Firm

Mean

147.2
14.3
7.5

Standard
Deviation
487.7
6.3
20.8
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Age
Total Assets ($million)
Revenues ($million)
Net Income ($million)

10.3
2749.5
913.0
4.1

19.8
27898.8
5004.7
311.8

Table 2. Summary of 1998-2002 IPO Offer and Firm Characteristics (n=1231)

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: OSS VERSUS TRADITIONAL FIRM IPOS
As discussed, online service and software firms share a common cost structure where much of their cost is
incurred to either implement their network infrastructure or develop the software. Costs to provide service
to additional users or distribute a copy of the software are very low. Traditional firms have a more varied
cost structure and are less likely to face a market with minimum quality standards. The result, detailed in
the six hypotheses above, is that OSS firms are younger, smaller, riskier and less developed in terms of
net income and revenues than traditional firms.
Age of the firm at the IPO, the size of the firm (total assets), and revenues have also been used to estimate
risk (Ritter 1984). As a result these variables may also be estimates of risk inherent in a firm. In addition,
risk may also be measured using the beta—a quantitative measure of the volatility relative to the overall
market. For this study beta is measured as the slope of a regression where the return of the individual
stock is regressed on the market (the equally-weighted NASDAQ index) return from 20 market days to
150 market days. The hypotheses are tested using a difference in means test. Results are summarized in
Table 3.

Age (years)
Total Assets ($million)
Revenues ($million)
Net Income ($million)
Return on Assets
Beta (6 months)

Online service and
software firms
n
mean
std
525
5.63
6.96
525
441.31 2861.49
525
158.79
946.58
525
-35.06
118.14
525
-0.36
0.91
525
2.43
1.56

Traditional firms
n
706
706
706
706
706
706

mean
13.81
4480.68
1479.82
33.70
-0.16
1.45

std
24.95
36739.74
6517.17
397.64
0.89
1.38

Difference in
means
t stat
sig.
7.308
***
2.513
**
4.608
***
3.838
***
3.821
***
-11.442
***

NOTE: *** = 99%, ** = 95%
Table 3. OSS vs. Traditional Firm IPO Comparison

All six of the hypotheses are supported by the data. It is clear that the characteristics of OSS firms at the
time of their IPO vary significantly from their traditional firm counterparts. Online service and software
firms are younger, riskier, smaller, and less developed at the IPO in terms of revenues and net income
than traditional firms.

ONLINE SERVICE VERSUS SOFTWARE FIRM IPOS
The next question to consider is whether there are differences between online service firms and software
firms. It is expected that these firms should share many similarities because of their common cost
structure. Online service firms and software firms should be equally risky ventures. This leads to the
following additional hypotheses.
At the time of their IPO:
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H7: Online service firms and software firms have similar ages,
H8: Total assets for online service firms are not different from software firms,
H9: Revenues for online service firms are not different from software firms,
H10: Net income for online service firms is not different from software firms,
H11: Return on assets for online service firms are not different from software firms, and
H12: Beta for online service firms is not different from software firms:
As in the previous analysis, these hypotheses are tested using a difference in means test. Results are
summarized in Table 4.

Software firms

Age (years)
Total Assets ($million)
Revenues ($million)
Net Income ($million)
Return on Assets
Beta (6 months)

n
182
182
182
182
182
182

mean
6.75
231.26
152.92
-28.11
-0.29
2.22

std
5.44
981.81
788.47
137.04
0.50
1.56

Online service firms
n
343
343
343
343
343
343

mean
5.03
553.83
161.95
-38.86
-0.39
2.53

std
7.59
3469.32
1022.77
106.45
1.07
1.60

Difference in
means
t stat
sig.
-2.721
***
1.252
0.118
-1.337
-1.245
1.800

NOTE: *** = 99%
Table 4. Software vs. Online Service Firm IPO Comparison

The results support the six hypotheses in all but the age hypothesis. Online service firms and software
firms are not significantly different when comparing total assets, revenues, net income, return on assets,
or the beta measure. Software firms are older than the online service firms at the time of the IPO, but the
difference of about 1.72 years is relatively small. Overall, online service firms and software firms share
many of the same characteristics because of their similar cost structures.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The primary conclusion made from this study is that cost structure does matter when categorizing firms
for financial analysis. OSS firms are quite different from traditional firms at the time of their IPO. And as
expected, online service firms and software firms are very similar at the time of their IPOs. The findings
of this study have practical implications for financial analysts and also indicate some future directions for
IPO research.
From a practical perspective, the results of this study indicate that investment analysts and underwriters
must first consider cost structure when analyzing firms. There are inherent risk differences across the OSS
and traditional sectors and the factors that predict various outcomes may vary accordingly. This may
effect decisions to underwrite IPOs as well as buy/hold/sell recommendations.
For IPO research the next step is to investigate each firm category separately to identify whether there are
differences in models that predict outcomes such as long-run return, risk, and likelihood of failure. The
question to address is whether different factors significantly affect these dependent variables using results
from past IPOs. Our study focuses on the 1998 through 2002 period. We chose this period because of the
rapidly increasing number of OSS firms that went public. However, in the latter years this time frame
includes the dot com bubble, a period of falling stock prices and a general decline in the number of IPOs.
By expanding the period of study we can also establish a baseline for other low marginal cost firms preInternet to identify differences, if any, which have occurred when online service firms began to appear.
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